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Neoplatonic theory of emanation than with either science or evolution. It is unfortunate that he does not allude in this connection to the idealist philosophy of nature which flourished in Germany while the German notion of the State was taking form.

The remainder of the book is devoted to a more detailed analysis of biological facts bearing upon the relation between intraspecific selection and the survival of species. The author takes the position that such selection plays only an accessory part in evolution. He rightly urges that an intraspecific struggle (such as war) might give rise to forms which would be less well adapted in competition with other species, and he shows that there is at least some positive evidence that this is the case. His grounds for the conclusion are, first, the well-known paleontological generalization that groups often show extraordinary variability and specialization shortly before they become extinct,—specialization being accompanied by decreased plasticity in the face of new conditions,—and second, the probability that intraspecific struggle is especially likely to further specialization. The second point seems to be less well developed than its importance in the author's case requires.

M. Anthony does not deal with the more controversial questions about natural selection raised by theories of discontinuous variation and the factorial theory of inheritance. Indeed, he does not make entirely clear what factors in evolution he regards as proved, an omission which gives the biological parts of the book an air of being somewhat provisional. The problem of the biological significance of war can hardly be treated constructively without a complete theory of evolution and in particular a theory of heredity. The immediate purpose of showing the pseudo-scientific nature of the defense of war as a means of progress based upon natural selection is admirably carried out.

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A Defence of Idealism. By MAY SINCLAIR. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1917.—pp. 339 and appendix.

This is not a book which is to be dismissed lightly as the amateurish by-product of a successful novelist. To be sure, the greater part of the book is concerned with the recent, the fashionable, the popular. Samuel Butler, Psycho-analysis, Bergson, Pragmatism and the New Realism, Evelyn Underhill, Tagore and the New Mysticism—discussions of these topics fill up the bulk of the pages. One wonders not infrequently whether the cult of the new and the contemporary has not distorted the perspective of the past—and the present too. Here is a "defence of Idealism" which mentions Plato and Aristotle but incidentally, and in order to bring out what it is that they contributed to mysticism, *i. e.*, "Those people who *will* have it that Monism is the offshoot of Mysticism, a disease of thought reverting to a savage ancestry, should really read their Plato all over again, and Aristotle on the top of him . . . when it may become clear to them that Mysticism owes more to philosophy than philosophy could ever owe to it" (p. 245). One will rightly judge

and think that some of the deeper motives and convictions which have entered into the substance of Idealism will not receive here the attention which is due them. But it deserves to be said that although Miss Sinclair does dip into the historic stream of philosophical reflection only where it comes pretty much to the surface in the shape of the current and the fashionable discussions, nevertheless her plunge is complete and it is bold. Her discussions are subtle, closely reasoned, not infrequently profound and also vivacious.

A bare outline of the argument is about as follows. From a discussion of the Pan-Psychism of Samuel Butler it emerges that "we cannot explain or account for the most ordinary facts of our life and consciousness without presupposing that we have lived and been conscious before" (p. 22). But as against Butler it is urged that "unless the Individual carried through all his previous experiences some personal identity over and above that of his progenitors, their experience will remain theirs, and be no earthly good to him" (p. 22). Some recognition of the truth of this constitutes the "purified spirit" of psycho-analysis. "The reality that underlies its practice is the breaking of the spell of forgetfulness; the deliverance of the Will-to-live from its bondage to the Unconscious" (p. 9). What then is self, and wherein lies the secret of personal identity? Memory gives us no answer to the question, a thesis which is the outcome of the author's acute discussion of Bergson in Chapter II. The Animism of McDougall is vindicated as against Parallelism, but it appears from an examination both of psychology and of metaphysics that "the universe is not built up from the Life-Force in action upon matter alone; not from Matter itself alone; not from the Individual Self alone; nor from an Unknown and Unknowable alone; nor from Body and Soul alone; nor from Consciousness alone; still less from thought alone that lands you in the barren Absolute" (p. 126). One might suppose then that not anything alone will furnish a clew to the universe, and that Monism is disproved. But not at all. We are to search for a term which will include all of these and everything else. "But, if there were one term that would cover all these terms: Life-Force; Matter; Individual Self; Substance; Thing-in-itself; the Unknown and Unknowable or possible Third; Soul; Consciousness; Thought; the Absolute; one term which, besides covering all these, covers also that which has slipped away from them—Will and Love, that term, could we find it, would stand for the Reality we want. We want a term infinitely comprehensive, and perfectly elastic; and a term that does some modest sacrifice to the Unknown" (p. 126). Before expounding the modest mysticism which is to accomplish this, the author pays her respects to Pragmatism and the New Realism. For these tell her that her quest is meaningless and hopeless. In my judgment these are the two most satisfactory chapters in the book. She succeeds, I believe, in uncovering beneath these philosophies of Pluralism, an implicit appeal to something total and comprehensive. But she errs in supposing that Pragmatism is nothing but the older Utilitarianism come to life again. The motive and texture of Dewey's version of Instrumentalism, quite different from the James-Schiller brand, are not once mentioned. The chapter on the 'New Mysticism' is an

adumbration of that Reality which is to be so comprehensive and inclusive that nothing is left out. The reader who looks for the solution of philosophical problems is likely to feel that this is the least satisfactory. How far has one gotten in the understanding of Idealism, even as a philosophical doctrine, if one entirely omits all reference to the task of social reconstruction and the vision of social redemption? And what is it at bottom that distinguishes a mysticism based upon the search for life and the will to live and make live from a heathenism which Mr. Santayana has somewhere defined as the religion of will, the faith which life has in itself because it is life, and in its aims because it is pursuing them? Something of the mystic's vision and quest and experience does indeed enter into the historic synthesis of Idealism. But there has entered also the task of social salvation based upon a belief in the autonomy of certain values and ideals. We may be thankful to Miss Sinclair for this fresh statement of the unquenchable impulse to unity and life which so many current philosophies are content to ignore, and we shall not blame her for attempting more. But it remains true that the book is a defence of mysticism rather than a defence of idealism.

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Philosophy and the Social Problem. By WILL DURANT. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1917.—pp. x, 272.

The ethical theory on which the argument of this book is based is that virtue is intelligence because intelligence gives foresight and makes possible the coördination of human desires. This is a well-known and perfectly respectable view, as old as Socrates, whom the author accepts as the fount of all wisdom in matters ethical. A good deal may be said for this view and the author says it with vigor and pungency. It is perhaps a pity that he accompanies his excellent defense of the Socratic principle with so much self-conscious swagger of extreme modernity and the inevitable contemptuous flings at benighted mid-Victorians.

The proper business of philosophy, according to the author, is social reconstruction: it should act as the mediator between pure science and social and political administration, formulating in the light of scientific discoveries, new ends and purposes which shall guide the process of social and political reconstructions. He selects for exposition five philosophers whose ideas seem to him to agree as a whole or in part with this conception of philosophy's mission, considering in succession "the Socratic plea for intelligence, the Platonic hope for philosopher-Kings, Bacon's dream of knowledge organized and ruling the world, Spinoza's gentle insistence on democracy as the avenue of development, and Nietzsche's passionate defense of aristocracy and power." This thesis also has its merits and the author argues them with spirit and vivacity, giving many an interesting turn to his discussion of familiar philosophical systems. But here again it is regrettable that he spoils the effect of his own argumentation by much foolish ranting against the philosophies and philosophers of the